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MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
evidences further extension of Erie R.v. Tompkins into non-diversity
cases. The court found it necessary to look to the substantive law of the
state in order to determine a question preliminary to the ultimate federal
question. Whether to follow an inferior state court decision, was resolved
in the negative by departing from the lower state court decision because the
court in the instant case was convinced the state supreme court would hold
contra. This departure was prompted only by a "belief" that the federal
courts have the freedom in non-diversity cases to differ with an inferior
state court. This reasoning is the one used in diversity cases with unsettled
state law,23 though the court does not recognize the parallel in as many
words.
POST OFFICE-DISCRIMINATION IN POSTAL SERVICE
FOUND WHERE SERVICE CUT IN ONLY ONE OF
TWO CONTIGUOUS COMMUNITIES
Pursuant to a directive of the Postmaster General ordering nationwide
reduction of postal service, a postmaster of two contiguous communities
cut deliveries to the business district of one, while not disturbing those in
the other. Plaintiff, a businessman in the district whose deliveries were
cut, sought a temporary and permanent restraining order to compel the
postmaster to continue the same mail delivery service to plaintiff as plaintiff
had received prior to the issuance of the Postmaster General's directive.
Held, injunction issuing, that there must be no discrimination in postal
service between business districts of the two communities served by de-
fendant's post office. Fite v. Payne, 91 F. Supp. 896 (N.D. Tex. 1950).
The power of Congress to establish the postal system' includes the
regulation of the entire postal system, 2 all powers necessary to make the
grant effective,3 and all measures necessary to secure the safe, speedy and
prompt delivery and transmission of the mails.4 Since the Constitution
does not guarantee unrestricted use of the mails,5 the mere establishment of
the postal system does not automatically confer rights upon individuals to
receive its services free from either statutory restraints or discrimination. 7
Congress delegates to the Postmaster General power to make regula-
22. 304 U.S. 64 (1937).
23. Cooper v. American Airlines, Inc., supra note 6; MacGregor v. State Mut. Life
Assur. Co., sutra note 1; Huss v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, spra note 7; West v.
American Tel. & Tel. Co., supra note 6.
1. U. S. CONsT. Art. I, § 8, ci. 7.
2. Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (18771.
3. Ex parte Rapier, 143 U.S. 110 (1892).
4. United States v. Musgrave, 160 Fed. 700 (E.D. Ark. 1908).
5. Warren v. United States, 183 Fed. 718 (Sth Cir. 1910).
6. Cf. Acret v. Harwood, 41 F. Supp. 492 (S.D. Cal. 1941),
7. Lewis Publishing Co. v. Morgan, 229 U.S. 288 (1913)(Congress was permitted,
in furtherance of the dissemination of knowledge, to so legislate as to favor publications,
though this intrinsically discriminated against the general public).
CASES NOTED
tions which are controlling, have the force of law, and are judicially noticed.8
The Postmaster General acts through local postmasters. 9  Discretionary
authority of the Postmaster General may be exercised over such matters as
establishment 0  and discontinuance"t of post offices and branch post
offices,' 2 establishment of mail boxes,13 carriage of mail on post roads, 14
employment of letter carriers for free mail delivery in every incorporated
area containing over 10,000 people,' 5 and the establishment of experimental
delivery in certain places.' The number of daily deliveries in all places
is fixed by the Post Office Department, and may not be changed except
by authority of the First Assistant Postmaster General.' 7
While it is the duty of the Post Office Department to deliver mail,
insofar as possible, to the individual for whom it is intended,'8 where the
decision of questions of fact is committed by Congress to the judgment and
discretion of a department head, his decision thereon is conclusive. 9 Even
upon mixed questions of law and fact, or of law alone, his action will carry
with it a strong presumption of its correctness, and the courts will not ordi-
narily review it in injunction proceedings.2 ' A department head is not
liable in mandamus2n  ' or injunction 22 for an error of judgment. In faith-
fully and impartially carrying out the Postmaster General's orders to deliver
the mails, a local postmaster is not generally interfered with in his judgment
and discretion, unless failure to deliver impairs a substantial right.23  How-
ever, it has been held that the Postmaster General was subject to mandamus
8. Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 1 (U.S. 1825); Caha v. United States, 152 U.S.
211, 220 (1894); Ex parte Willman, 277 Fed. 819 (S.D. Ohio 1921).
9. Fite v. Payne, 91 F. Supp. 21 (N.D, Tex. 1950),
10, 42 STAT. 24 (1921), 39 U.S.C. § 1 (1946).
11. 42 STAT. 24 (1921), 39 U.S.C. § 2 (1946); ef. Ware v. United States, 4 XValI.
617 (U.S. 1867).
12. REV. STAr. § 3871 (1875), 39 U.S.C. § 158 (1946).
13. REV. STAT. § 3868 (1875), 39 US.C. § 155 (1946).
14. REv. STAT. § 3965 (1875), 39 U.S.C. § 483 (1946).
15. 24 STAT. 355 (1887), 39 U.S.C. § 151 (1946).
16. 37 STAT. 559 (1912), 39 U.S.C. § 153 (1946).
17. 39 CODE FED. REcs. § 50.2 (1938).
18. Fite v. Payne, sup ra note 9.
19. Bates & Guild Co. v. Payne, 194. U.S. 106 (1904) (court refused to review
Postmaster General's order declaring plaintiff's publication not to be a periodical); Re-
view of Reviews Co. v. Hitchcock, 192 Fed. 359 (S.D.N.Y. 1911) (enforcement of Post
Office Department economy measure requiring certain class of periodicals to be shipped
by slower freight method than others); Miller v. United States, 233 U.S. 1 (1914) (in
action by carrier, court refused to review Postmaster General's discontinuance of contract
to carry mail over designated Alaskan route); cf. Neil, Moore & Co. v. Ohio, 3 How.
720 (U.S. 1845) (". . . it rests altogether in the discretion of the Postmaster General
. . . to determine at what hours the mail shall leave particular places and arrive at others;
and to determine whether it shall leave the same place only once a day or more fre-
quently. Upon this point his decision is absolute . . . and cannot be controlled by a
State or by the courts. . . . The Postmaster General is, upon this subject, the proper
and only judge of what the public interest and coneience requires . ).
20. See note 19 supra.
21. Kendall v. Stokes, 3 How. 87 (U.S. 1845).
22. Gaines v. T1hompson, 7 Wall. 347 (U.S. 1868).
23. Griffith v. W. S. Wick Grocery Co., 272 Fed. 246 (6th Cir. 1921).
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in the performance of a purely ministerial duty,2 4 and to a writ of injunc-
tion where his action was not authorized by the statutes under which he
assumed to act.25
In the instant case, the court did not mention the First Assistant Post-
master General's exclusive authority to order changes in the number of daily
mail deliveries. No authority was cited by the court, nor has any been
found, for the proposition that continued receipt of mail at fixed intervals
is such a substantial right as will justify the court in interfering with the
discretionary authority of the Postmaster General and local postmasters.
While analogous cases have bccn decided on the basis of the defendant's
exceeding his statutory authority, such was not the situation here. Prior to
the instant case, no court had undertaken to enjoin a postmaster from carry-
ing out the orders of his superior, onl thc grounds of discriminatoin. While
a local postmaster may not be afforded so wide a latitude in exercising dis-
cretionary authority as the Postiastcr General, the court, in deciding the
instant case, would appear to have acted without substantial authority.
SALES-EXECUTED CONTRACTS-SALE OF FRUIT ON TREES
Plaintiff, cirtus grower, contracted with defendants, fruit packers, for
the sale of unpicked grapefruit, the probable barvesting date being set more
than two months from the date of contract. Defendants ring-picked the
orchard five times and then refused to clean the trees, as provided in the
contract, charging that the fruit had not developed suitably for their pur-
poses due to the plaintiff's breach of an implicd obligation to care for and
water the orchard. Plaintiff sought to recover the difference between the
contract price and that obtained by a sale of the remaining fruit. The trial
court entered an instructed verdict for the plaintiff which was reversed and
remanded by the Court of Civil Appeals' on the grounds of error in refusing
to let the defense of implied obligations go to the jury. Held, affirming
the instructed verdict for the plaintiff, the contract was one of sale and
passed immediate title to the defendants, thus relieving the plaintiff from
further duty. Moffitt v. Hieby, 229 S.W.2d 1005 (Tex. 1950).
A contract is executed when nothing remains to be done by either
party.2 In the case of a contract for the sale of personal property the ques-
tion of execution is one of fact," the answer to which is dependent upon
24. Kendall v. United States, 12 Pet. 524 (U.S. 1838).
25. American School of Magnetic Healing v. NMcAnnulty, 187 U.S. 94 (1902).
1. Moffit v. Ilieby, 225 S.W.2d 411 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949).
2. Hatch v. Standard Oil Co., 100 U.S. 124 (1879); Farrington v. Tennessee, 95
U.S. 679 (1877); E. C. Artman Lumber Co. v. Bogard, 191 Ky. 392, 230 S.W. 953
(1921).
3. N. P. Sloan Co. v. Barhain, 138 Ark. 350, 211 S.W. 381 (1919); First National
Bank of Ottumwa v. Reno, 73 Iowa 145, 34 N.W. 796 (1887); Johnson v. Tabor, 101
Miss. 78, 57 So. 365 (1912); Sanford v. Nickerson, 91 N.I. 71, 13 A.2d 723 (1940).
